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Abstract
Interpreting entropy as a prior probability suggests a universal but “purely
empirical” measure of “goodness of fit”. This allows statistical techniques
to be used in situations where the correct theory — and not just its pa-
rameters — is still unknown. As developed illustratively for least-squares
nonlinear regression, the measure proves to be a transformation of the R2
statistic. Unlike the latter, however, it diminishes rapidly as the number
of fitting parameters increases.
1. Introduction
Statistics, as commonly practiced, suffers from well-known conceptual difficulties. The
textbook procedure is to assume provisionally a “null hypothesis” H0 and then reject it if
it leads to too small a probability for the actual outcome or “data” D. But D, being only
one of very many possible outcomes, is never very likely. To make up for this, one lumps
D with other unlikely outcomes, but the manner of lumping — equivalently the choice of
statistic — is subject to whim. † Besides, it does not really make sense to reject H0 unless
⋆
Published in Int. J. Theor. Phys. 22 : 1091-1104 (1983)
† One could remove this ambiguity by finding and using a “universal statistic”. This seems
to be the proposal of [1] with the statistic being the (logarithm of the) “likelihood ratio”.
1
some other tenable hypothesis H1 explains D better.
♭ The Bayesian method overcomes
these problems, but introduces a new source of subjectivity with the need to assign “prior
probabilities”. The lack of a systematic way to do this becomes especially disturbing when
one is dealing with an infinite-dimensional parameter-space (function space).
Probably none of these difficulties is too serious when it is a question of estimating
a parameter in a theory of known form, and certainly they are all unimportant in the
large N limit, where normality always prevails and all applicable prescriptions agree. But
what about purely “phenomenological” applications where there are relatively few obser-
vations and even the functional form of the true distribution is unknown? In this type of
situation one might doubt whether statistics makes sense at all, but unfortunately such a
“phenomenological fit” to the data is often all that one really has, especially in fields such
as sociology and economics where usually one knows neither the form of the underlying
functional relation (if any) nor the distribution of the random deviations from that relation
(the “errors”). (See, e.g. [3].) In the physical sciences one usually does know the theory
in advance, but even here “phenomenological” questions of the sort “Are the galaxies ran-
domly distributed in the sky?” can arise. And then how is one to decide whether a seeming
regularity — say a clumping or a presence of filaments — is really present?
As I just said, “Bayesian statistics” allows one to pose such questions, but it can
answer them objectively only to the extent that the notions of a “theory” and of its “prior
probability” can be freed of the subjective interpretation they usually carry. This paper
will attempt such a liberation in two steps. First we will re-interpret “probability of the
theory T” to mean “probability that the state of the universe is such that T holds”; and
then we will try to use the formulas S = k lgN and S/k = −I (I being information)
to estimate this probability. In other words we take seriously the fact that even such
things as societies or economies are ultimately physical systems and therefore try to apply
universally the basic formulas of statistical mechanics and information theory.
To see what this might mean in practice, we will focus on the particular problem
of (non-linear) regression or “curve fitting” and will derive a quantitative criterion of
“goodness of fit” which will be given explicitly for the class of least-squares fits.
♭ Of course this sketch is a caricature, but the dangers referred to are ones which thoughtful
statisticians have been able more to warn against than to eliminate systematically. [2].
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2. Entropy and prior probabilities
In “curve fitting” one is seeking the functional dependence — if any – of some variable y
on a second variable x. Usually one writes the presumed dependence in the form
y = f(x) + u (2.1)
where u is the “error”, but for simplicity and generality we can deal directly with the
collection of probabilities P (y; x).
Definition The data D is the collection of “observed” pairs.
(For example, we might be seeking the dependence of height on age. Then xi could be the
age in months of the ith individual and yi his or her height to the nearest centimeter.) We
will also assume that the observations are independent, and can then make the
Definition A (phenomenological) theory T is an assignment to each possible pair (y, x)
of a number P (y; x) representing the hypothetical probability of y given x.
Here x, the variable regarded as “independent”, must range over some finite set, and for
each of its values, y must range over some finite set appropriate to x.
Now let −I(T ) be the log of the (unnormalized) “prior probability” of theory T , and
let −I(D|T ) be the log probability of D according to T (compare [4]):
I(D|T ) =
N∑
i=1
lgP (yi; xi)
−1 (2.2)
Then the probability that both T is true and D occurs is p(T ) = e−I(D,T ) where
I(D, T ) = I(D|T ) + I(T ) (2.3)
As is well known this p results as the “posterior probability” of T when the standard rules
of probability are applied, and then the theory which maximized p(T ) would be the “best
bet”.
But why should the rules of probability apply to theories? Well, the yi and xi must
be observables of some physical system (a person, a collection of galaxies, an economy
etc.) and it is not necessarily unwarranted to ask for the probability for a general system
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in a given class to possess (commuting) observables y, x and to be in a state such that the
P (y; x) have the values specified by a given theory T .
Having made this leap let us continue a bit further. What we have called the “system”
is really just a state of a more general system. (For example an economy is a collection of
atoms in a particular quantum state. ⋆) Treating the system as a “black box” characterized
by the probabilities P (y; x), we can ask what is the number (suitably defined) of states
which yield a given set of P ’s, that is to say, a given T . If N is the number of states in this
collection — let us call it the collection of “realizations” of T — then logN = S(T )/k =
−I(T ) is the corresponding entropy.
Conversely by estimating S we would discover the needed “prior” probabilities eS .
Equivalently we could estimate the information needed to build (at least) one of the pos-
sible realizations, R, of T from the given constituents. If I(R) is the information needed
for a particular realization (equal by definition to the minimum entropy created in actu-
ally building R), then as in thermodynamics, max
R
{−I(R)} is often a reliable estimate of
−I(T ). Our rule, then, will be to estimate I(T ) from the simplest concrete realization of
T .
This is still quite vague in practice, but we can make it much more definite by restrict-
ing ourselves to simple realizations of a special sort, namely to Turing-machines which can
compute the function (y, x)→P (y; x). † It is clear that an actual system realizing T could
be constructed from such a Turing machine with little extra effort. ♭
Of course with sufficient general knowledge about the type of system under consider-
ation one could conceivably show in a particular case that such Turing-machine estimates
of I(T ) were inappropriate. But such knowledge would be precisely the theory which, by
definition, is lacking in “phenomenological” applications. When a theory is not lacking,
⋆ It is not clear, however, that the notion of observable can be assimilated to that of state
this way.
† By assuming such a machine exists we are of course restricting the possible theories, but
only in a way harmless on the phenomenological level. (cf. [5])
♭ In this connection note that quantum systems can furnish truly random numbers.
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one should look directly thereto for the prior probability of T . Also notice that many
general systems could actually be set up to mimic Turing-machines, and the idea that a
computation-like process exists as a quotient of the system is not nearly as bizarre as the
idea that it exists within it as a subsystem.
We have now arrived at a prescription which (although it is still not fully defined)
might have more immediate plausibility for some people than the chain of steps leading to
it. Let us formulate it directly.
Criterion That theory T best fits given data D which minimizes I(D, T ) = I(D|T ) +
I(T ), where I(T ) is the complexity (information content) of the simplest ⋆ Turing-machine
which can compute the probabilities P (y; x) defining T .
Thus stated, the criterion appears as a kind of Occam’s razor, balancing naive good-
ness of fit [as measured by the log-likelihood, −I(D|T )] against complexity of the theory
achieving the fit [as measured by I(T )].
Unfortunately the correct definition of Turing machine complexity for our purposes
is far from evident despite the efforts of many workers [6] [7]. Nevertheless we will see
in the next section that attention to parameter-storage requirements can enable one to
say something about I(T ) even in the absence of a general theory of Turing-machine
complexity.
⋆ This will always be well-defined (relative to a definition of Turing-machine complexity)
because the number of machines with complexity less than a given value is finite. In fact
one can go further and ask whether the prior probability e−I(T ) is normalizable over the
class of all Turing-machines. If it is, or at least if e−I(D,T ) is normalizable for fixed D,
then our earlier interpretation, following equation (2.3), of p(T ) as a “posterior probability”
takes on a precise meaning. In connection with our criterion notice also that when D is
data for a large number N of actually independent repetitions of the same experiment,
then as N→∞ the T which predicts the true probabilities will eventually do better than
every other. More precisely let D = (D1, D2, · · · , DN ), let the true probability of D be∏
p(Di), and consider only theories T of the form P (D) =
∏N
i=1 q(Di). For large N the
(essentially) constant term I(T ) becomes negligible in comparison to I(D|T ). Hence the
maximum likelihood estimate for q becomes best, and this is known to approach the true
probability function p.
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A development strictly analogous to that which follows would thus go through for
any theory whose information content can be estimated in terms of its need for parameter
storage. In particular the treatable theories are in no way limited to those hypothesizing
normal errors. † However for analytical convenience in estimating I(D|T ) we will henceforth
restrict ourselves to this class of theories, i.e. to fits of the least-squares type.
3. Application to (non-linear) least-squares regression
Although an information-theoretical viewpoint really presupposes bounded discrete data
(otherwise I =∞) it will be harmless, and analytically convenient, to treat y as continuous
and ranging from −∞ to ∞. The character of x will not matter, but for definiteness we
can imagine it as a column vector with rational entries. Also, we will define for any class
of theories, C,
I(D[C]) = min
T∈C
{I(D|T ) + I(T )}
as the value of I(D, T ) attained by that theory of type C which affords the best “phe-
nomenological fit” to D.
3a. The class of theories C0
Consider first the class C0 of theories asserting that y does not depend on x at all but is
normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation σ, i.e. which postulate
P (y; x) = (2πσ2)−1/2 e−(y−µ)
2/2σ2 (3.1)
for some µ and σ. Actually (3.1) cannot be a perfect equality. Rather, since we are
identifying theories with (equivalence classes of) Turing machines and no Turing machine
calculates with infinite precision, the theories of type C0 are really those which approximate
a normal distribution to some degree of accuracy. Let us estimate I(D[C0]) for this class.
† In fact our formal criterion is not really restricted to curve-fitting at all nor to the
assumption of repeated independent observations. As long as T is an assignment Y →P (Y )
[or Y →P (Y ;X)] of probabilities to overall outcomes, a calculation analogous to that given
below could be performed.
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Taken literally the distribution (3.1) leads to an I(D|T ) of the form
I(D|σ, µ) = N
2
lg(2πσ2) +
N∑
i=1
(y − µ)2
2σ2
, (3.2)
N being the number of data-points or “observations”. For given D this is a minimum
when
µ = µ0 = y ≡ N−1
∑
yi and
σ = σ0 = (y2 − y2)1/2 .
Expanding (3.2) to second order about these values yields
I(D|σ0 +∆σ, µ0 +∆µ) ≈ N
2
lg(2πeσ20) +N
(
∆σ
σ0
)2
+
N
2
(
∆µ
σ0
)2
(3.3)
(where e = 2.71728 . . .), which shows how imprecision in σ and µ affects the information
content of D with respect to T .
Now let TM be a Turing machine whose corresponding theory T (= the set of values
(P, y, x) computed by TM) is in the class C0. We can imagine TM as a computer with
program and hardware, and regard the length of the program residing in core as an estimate
of (more properly a lower bound for) the information content of TM. (See [7].) Then the
length of the shortest program for T will be an estimate of I(T ). Since P (y; x) depends
on the parameters σ, µ, our machine TM must in effect have access to them, and the
simplest way to achieve this will probably (except for very special values such as µ = 0)
be just to store σ and µ directly as part of the program itself. This need to store its
parameters implies a lower bound for the information content of TM, and therefore for
I(T ). In the sequel we will simply replace I(T ) by this lower bound, thereby acquiring an
approximation which neglects the information corresponding, in our computer image, to
the hardware and to the part of the program carrying out the actual computation.
The storage required to hold σ and µ to precisions δσ, δµ is approximately
lg δµ−1 + lg δσ−1 = I(δσ, δµ) . (3.4)
(For convenience we evade here and below the question — related to the actual discreteness
and boundedness of y — of the units in which y, σ and µ are stored.) If, further, we
approximate in (3.3) ∆µ2 by its mean, δµ2/12, with respect to a uniform distribution in
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the interval [−δµ/2, δµ/2], do the same for ∆σ2, and add the result to (3.4), we find for
I(D|T ) + I(T ) the approximation ♭
N
2
lg(2πeσ20) +
N
12
(
δσ
σ0
)2
− lg δσ + N
24
(
δµ
σ0
)2
− lg δµ . (3.5)
Minimizing this with respect to δµ and δσ furnishes finally the approximation for I(D[C0]):
I(D[C0]) ≈ N − 2
2
lg(2πeσ20) + lgN + 1.70 (3.6a)
σ20 = y
2 − y2 , (3.6b)
which corresponds to storing σ and µ with precisions
δσ =
√
6/N σ0 , δµ =
√
12/N σ0 .
It seems remarkable that these values of δσ and δµ, which here represent the optimal
precision for storing σ and µ, equal the fluctuations one would expect to see (for large N)
in the sample mean and variance!
3b. The class C1
Let us generalize to theories which continue to assume independent normal errors but
which allow for a functional dependence of y on x. In particular consider the class C1 of
theories corresponding to a least-squares fit of the data to a fixed set of functional forms
y = f(x; θα) (3.7)
where θ0, θ1, · · · , θK are parameters on which f depends. (For example f(x; θ) might be a
polynomial in the components of x and the θα its coefficients.) In other words, a particular
T ∈ C1 says (to some approximation) that
P (y; x) = (2πσ2)−1/2 exp
(
− (y − f(x; θ))
2
2σ2
)
. (3.8)
♭ In line with the neglect of the part of the program concerned with actual computation as
opposed to parameter storage, we neglect also the increase in I(D|T ) due to computational
round-off error.
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Notice that T involves a total of K + 2 parameters: σ and the K + 1 parameters θα.
As before we have
I(D, T ) = I(D|σ∗ +∆σ, θ∗α +∆θα) , (3.9)
where σ∗ and θ∗α are the optimum values of σ and θα (the values we attempt to store) and
∆σ and ∆θα are the deviations therefrom when σ and θα are stored with precisions δσ
and δθα.
Without having the exact functional form of f one cannot find I(D[C1]) precisely.
Nonetheless one can without specializing f still estimate very crudely the minimum of
(3.9) with respect to σ∗, θ∗, δσ, and δθ. This is done in the Appendix. To express the
result most conveniently, let us define
V = y2 − y2 = sample-variance of y (3.10)
and denote by ‘s2’ the minimum mean-square residual, corresponding to the choice θ = θ∗.
Then the minimum of (3.9) occurs for
σ∗ ≈
(
N − 2
N −K − 2
)1/2
s (3.11)
and has the value
I(D[C1]) ≈ N −K − 2
2
lg
2πeNs2
N −K − 2 +
K
2
lg(2πeV ) +
K
2
lg
N − 2
12
+ lgN + 1.7 . (3.12)
Notice incidentally that σ∗ has been automatically revised upward from s by an amount
which, for large K and N , reproduces perfectly the usual adjustment for “K degrees of
freedom”!
3c. Comparing different functional forms
Given any pair of theories, T ′ and T ′′, the difference
H(T ′′, T ′) = I(D, T ′)− I(D, T ′′) (3.13)
estimates the log of the ratio of the posterior probabilities of T ′′ and T ′, and can be said to
measure how much more “informative” theory T ′′ is than T ′ with respect to the data D.
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Within the class of “least-squares fits”, i.e., of theories of some class C1, it is convenient
to refer everything to the simple class C0 and define
H(C1) = I(D[C0])− I(D[C1]) (3.14)
or, equivalently, H(C1) = H(T
∗
1 , T
∗
0 ), where T
∗
1 and T
∗
0 are the best theories in their
respective classes. To evaluate H we need only observe that with the present notation
(suited to C1) the parameter σ
2
0 in eqs. (3.6) should be called V . With this substitution
the difference of (3.6a) and (3.12) becomes
H ≈ N −K − 2
2
lg
V/(N − 2)
s2/(N −K − 2) −
K
2
lg
N − 2
12
(3.15)
Before discussing this expression let us recall that it can be a good approximation toH
only when we can ignore the terms in I(T ) which we identified with the computer hardware
and with the parts of the programs concerned with actually performing calculations. If
we imagine that both programs use the same machine then the hardware term drops out
of the difference, H. But the terms due to the programs cannot really be ignored; in fact
they are needed in general to disfavor extremely elaborate forms for f in (3.7). In practice,
however, f is usually very simple — in fact it is often linear ⋆ — so that our approximation
may not be too bad. Nevertheless (3.15) does unfairly favor C1 over C0 to some extent.
Written in terms of the standard definition, R2 = 1− s2/V , equation (3.15) reads
H ≈ N −K − 2
2
lg
(N −K − 2)/(N − 2)
1−R2 −
K
2
lg
N − 2
12
. (3.16)
⋆ For linear f (f(x) =
∑
bαx
α + µ) the very crude estimates of the Appendix can be
improved because I(D|σ, θ) = I(D|σ, µ, bα) is then a calculable explicit function of its
arguments. With respect to a particular strategy for storing the parameters, I(δσ, δθ) can
also be found explicitly and the effect of the boundedness and discreteness of y can be
taken into account. For a seemingly reasonable choice of storage-strategy such an analysis
leads to an H differing from (3.15) by an expression AK where A depends on the particular
data D and is of order unity unless the matrix xαxβ − xαxβ is badly ill-conditioned or R2
is very small (very poor fit).
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That R2 has an information-theoretic meaning has long been recognized ([1] Chap. 10, §3,
§4). In fact from (3.2), (3.8), and the definition (2.2), it follows immediately that
min
σ,µ
I(D|σ, µ) = N
2
lg(2πeV ) ,
min
σ,θ
I(D|σ, θ) = N
2
lg(2πes2) .
Hence
min
σ,µ
I(D|σ, µ)−min
σ,θ
I(D|σ, θ) = N
2
lg
V
s2
=
N
2
lg
1
1−R2 , (3.17)
to which we would have been led in place of H had we set out to minimize I(D|T ) alone,
rather than its sum with I(T ). †
For purely phenomenological purposes, however, a theory with only two parameters
is not equivalent to one with many parameters, even if the latter reduces to the former for
certain values of the extra parameters. Other things being equal the former, simpler theory
is preferable; and (3.15) takes account of this by diminishing (3.17) in a manner that grows
more and more severe as K approaches N . In particular a fit with more parameters than
data points is automatically excluded because of the factors (N − K − 2) in (3.15) and
(3.16).
4. Discussion
Taken together with (2.2) and (2.3), any workable definition of I(T ) provides a completely
general measure, H, in terms of which one can compare any two phenomenological theories
intended to describe given data D.
A phenomenological theory in the sense of this paper admits realization by Turing
machines and, insofar as one can ignore ambiguity arising from the possibility of different
† Notice that (3.17) is just the log of the maximum-likelihood ratio for C1 versus C0. It
follows immediately from this that as N→∞ with K, V , s2 fixed, the leading terms of
(3.15) coincide with the expression, lg(max. likelihood ratio)−K/2 lgN , derived in [8] as
the prior-independent, asymptotic form of a Bayesian posterior. To discover the basis for
this agreement one might begin by asking what must be added to the assumptions of [8]
to obtain the particular finite-sample expression, H.
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representations of input (x, y) and output P (y; x), a given T is realized by a unique class
of machines. With respect to such a realization — and with respect to a definition of the
information content of a Turing machine — the evaluation of I(T ) becomes in effect a
problem in recursive function theory.
The work of the last section attempts to approach the least-squares method of curve-
fitting from this standpoint by regarding such a fit as a phenomenological theory char-
acterized by the parameters σ, θα, δσ, δθα of equations (3.7)-(3.9). In this important
special case, equation (3.16) should be a reasonable first approximation to H, at least
insofar as most of I(T ) can be regarded as subsisting in the parameters θ rather than
in the capacity ♭ to compute f . The difference in H between, for example, a logarithmic
and a quadratic fit would then express in absolute units the difference in the amount of
information “extracted” from the data by the one fit compared to the other. In particular
H itself compares a given fit to one denying any functional dependence of y on x.
When (3.16) is large for a particular functional form C1, we would like to say that
the observed variation of y with x is “meaningful”. But how do we know that some
other, non-C1 theory based on a completely different functional relation between y and x
(perhaps in conjunction with a highly non-normal and x-dependent “error distribution”)
might not offer a still smaller I(D, T ) than the least-squares fit in question? From the
point of view advocated here, the only fully satisfactory course would be to examine every
Turing machine small enough to be relevant to the data and call significant only those
features shared by all T which came sufficiently close to realizing the absolute minimum of
I(D, T ). Until we have a simple way to survey so many possibilities, though, it looks like
(3.16) could serve as a useful guide to whether an observed variation of y with x should
be taken seriously.
♭ One can probably estimate this extra complexity for simple functional forms (in par-
ticular for the linear form) and correct H accordingly. Alternatively one could render it
negligible by lumping together a sufficiently large number of phenomenological studies all
of which used the same functional form for f . This would make sense only when all the
studies really were in some way part of a larger social project, such as determining the
toxicity of a large number of industrial chemicals.
12
As a first step beyond this, one could try to develop tests which, when applied to
particular data D, would yield a lower bound to I(D[C]) for a reasonably large class
C of choices of a functional form f(x; θ) and of a probability distribution for the error
term, y − f(x; θ). Of course statisticians have already constructed many such alternative
C’s (generalized least-squares, logistic,. . . ) and for each one it should be easy to obtain
the estimate of I(D[C]) analogous to the estimates, (3.6) and (3.12). The more of these
theories one tried with given data, the more confident one could feel with that particular
one (or ones) which attained the least value of I(D|T ) + I(T ).
This research was partly supported by NSF grant PHY78-24275.
Appendix: Estimation of I(D[C1])
We will assume that the parameter θ0 is an overall constant, µ, in f and reserve the symbol
‘θ’ for θα, α ≥ 1, so that f has the form
f(x;µ, θ) = µ+ g(x; θ1 · · · θK) . (A1)
For arbitrary σ, µ, and θ, I(D|σ, µ, θ) is from (3.8) and the definition (2.2) of I(D|T )
I(D|σ, µ, θ) = N
2
lg(2πσ2) +N
u2
2σ2
(A2)
where
u = y − µ− g(x; θ) (A3)
and the overhead bar denotes the sample mean, as always.
In terms of z := y − g(x; θ), (A2) takes the form
N
2
lg(2πσ2) +
N(z − µ)2
2σ2
For fixed θ, this is a function of σ and µ; and we can approximate it by expanding about
its minimum. As with eq. (3.2) the minimum occurs for
µ = z , σ = v1/2 , (A4)
13
where
v := z2 − z2 ;
and the expansion analogous to (3.3) is
I(D|σ, µ, θ) ≈ N
2
lg(2πev) +N
∆σ2
v
+N
∆µ2
2v
, (A5)
where ∆σ = σ−v1/2, ∆µ = µ−z. If σ and µ in (A4) are stored with precisions δσ and δµ
then, as before, we can estimate ∆σ2 and ∆µ2 in (A5) by δσ2/12 and δµ2/12 respectively.
Adding the result to
I(σ, µ, θ) = lg δσ−1 + lg δµ−1 + I(θ)
yields
I(D, T ) ≈ N
2
lg(2πev) +N
δσ2
12v
− lg δσ +N δµ
2
24v
− lg δµ+ I(θ) . (A6)
Here we have assumed that σ and µ are stored independently of each other and of θ and
have written ‘I(θ)’ for the storage required by the θα. Minimizing (A6) with respect to δµ
and δσ gives
I(D, T ) ≈ N − 2
2
lg(2πev) + lg
Nπe2√
18
+ I(θ) , (A7)
with the minimum occurring at δσ = (6v/N)1/2, δµ = (12v/N)1/2, as in (3.6).
We now imagine that each of the θα is stored with the same relative precision, ε, i.e.
that ∆θα = ηαθα with −ε/2 < ηα < ε/2. (Allowing ε to depend on α would not change
anything.) Then
I(θ) = −K lg ε ,
whose sum with (A7) is to be minimized.
To do so we must know how v, the sample variance of y− g(x; θ), depends on ∆θ. In
order to have a general expression for this let us expand v about the value θ = θ∗ which
minimizes it, and furthermore estimate — very roughly — that the deviations ∆θα give
rise to corresponding relative deviations of g(x; θ) from g(x; θ∗). In other words we assume
that, due to the imprecision in θα, each g(x; θ) suffers an error of about
±ηαV 1/2 (A8)
(Here V 1/2 = y2−y2 (defined in eq. 3.10) is being taken as a typical scale for y, such scales
for the θ’s (with respect to which it will be most efficient to store them) being derived
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from V together with typical scales for the components of x.) For each of the N data
points (y, x) there are K such errors and assuming these NK errors to combine roughly
independently (and independently of y − g(x; θ∗)) we can expect
v ≈ s2 +Kε2V/12 , (A9)
where s2 = v|θ=θ∗ is the minimum of v.
Under these assumptions and estimates (A7) becomes
I(D, T ) ≈ N − 2
2
lg[2πe(s2 +Kε2V/12)]−K lg ε+ lg Nπe
2
√
18
.
Minimizing this with respect to ε (and neglecting a small negative term which never exceeds
−1) produces eq. (3.12) of the text; and substituting the minimizing value, ε2 = 12s2/(N−
K − 2)V , into (A9) yields (3.11).
Remark 1 – It is possible to carry out the minimization leading to (3.6) and the analogous
minimization leading to (3.11) and (3.12) without expanding in ∆σ; i.e., one minimizes
〈I(D|T )〉+I(T ), where the brackets denote exact expectations with respect to ∆σ and ∆µ
in the ranges [−δσ/2, δσ/2], [−δµ/2, δµ/2]. This alters (3.6), (3.11), and (3.12) slightly
but does not affect H, which in this sense can therefore be regarded as exact, even for
small N .
Remark 2 – Strictly speaking it would be better to replace V by V −s2 in (A8) since only
this part of the variance of y can be associated to variations in f . This would increase H
in (3.16) by K lgR−1.
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